Before 2016, a defaulting company's promoters could often keep running it — and keep delaying creditors — for years through overlapping, slow-moving legal proceedings. The IBC's single biggest change was flipping who is actually in control the moment insolvency proceedings begin.
Before 2016, a company in financial distress could be dealt with under several different, overlapping laws — winding-up provisions in the Companies Act, the Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA) for reference to the erstwhile BIFR, and separate debt-recovery mechanisms like DRT/SARFAESI for secured lenders. These processes were not coordinated, often took years, and — critically — left existing management largely in place while creditors waited, giving promoters both the ability and the incentive to delay resolution.
The IBC's defining structural change is that the moment a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) is admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), the existing board of directors is suspended, and control of the company passes to an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) — an independent, licensed insolvency professional — who runs the company as a going concern under the oversight of the creditors themselves, organised into a Committee of Creditors (CoC).
IBC's stated objective is resolution — finding a viable path to revive the company as a going concern under new ownership/management via a resolution plan approved by the CoC — with liquidation treated as the fallback outcome if no viable resolution plan emerges within the statutory timeline. This is a deliberate policy shift from earlier regimes, which in practice often defaulted toward prolonged limbo or eventual, slow liquidation rather than active resolution.
On admission, a moratorium under Section 14 takes effect, which stays: institution or continuation of suits/legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, transfer or disposal of the debtor's assets, enforcement of security interests, and recovery of property by owners/lessors — creating a breathing space in which the company can be evaluated and a resolution plan formulated without individual creditors racing to enforce their own claims first.
For financial creditors, IBC gave a genuinely faster, more coordinated route to trigger insolvency and force a resolution process compared to fragmented recovery litigation. For operational creditors (particularly MSME suppliers), the practical experience has been more mixed — the pre-existing-dispute defense (see our related article) and the CoC-driven process (where operational creditors have limited voting rights compared to financial creditors) mean an operational creditor's leverage in the actual resolution outcome is generally weaker than a financial creditor's, even though both can trigger the process.
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