Niket V. Mehta V/s. Charu K. Mehta & Ors.

What happened

The petitioner, an alleged beneficiary of the Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust, filed a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking, as the main reliefs, a writ of mandamus directing the Joint Charity Commissioner-I, Head Office, Mumbai to follow the procedure prescribed by section 41D(2)(c) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 in Application No. 23 of 2025 pending before that authority, and a direction to expedite the hearing and final disposal of that application, with the other prayers being interim and consequential. It is admitted that the petitioner had filed the application under section 41D of the Act and that it is pending before the Joint Charity Commissioner. Counsel for the petitioner, for the first, second, third, fourth and twelfth respondents and for the State were heard, and ten interim applications were pending along with the petition. An earlier order of 22 July 2026 had granted ad-interim relief in its fifth paragraph.

Questions before the court

• Can a writ court direct the Joint Charity Commissioner to follow only the procedure in section 41D(2)(c) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act in a pending application made under section 41D, and what follows if the petitioner rejects the narrower relief that the Court is willing to grant?

Why the court ruled this way

The bench said that it could not accept the petitioner's insistence that the Court direct the authority to follow the procedure particularly prescribed under section 41D(2)(c) instead of the entire procedure under section 41D under which the application had been made, and observed that it appeared that the relief was sought with a view to sabotage the functioning of the authority (paragraph 4). It told the petitioner's counsel that, except for the words (2)(c) in the first prayer, it was inclined to allow the petition in terms of the first and second prayers, but counsel opposed that deletion and insisted that the petition be heard on merits (paragraphs 5–6). The bench was unwilling to hear the matter on merits so that it could pass the particular order desired by the petitioner, and it deprecated that stand (paragraph 7). It rejected the request to continue the ad-interim relief because the petitioner appeared to want to protract the litigation although the Court was inclined to grant substantive reliefs (paragraphs 10–11).

Controlling point

A writ court need not direct a statutory authority to follow a single sub-clause of the procedure under section 41D, and it may dismiss the petition in limine where the petitioner refuses the relief that the Court is prepared to give and insists on a merits hearing for a specific order.

Order and next steps

The Court dismissed the petition in limine, held that the ten interim applications did not survive and disposed of them, and rejected the request to continue for two weeks the ad-interim relief granted by paragraph 5 of the order of 22 July 2026, which had been made so that the petitioner could challenge the order before the Supreme Court.

Practical implications

A petitioner who wants a statutory authority directed to follow a statutory procedure should frame the prayer by reference to the whole provision under which the application was made, and should weigh carefully whether to accept relief that the Court is willing to grant in a modified form.

Limits of this ruling

• This is a short order dismissing the petition in limine. The Court did not decide the petitioner's standing as a beneficiary, any dispute in the trust, the merits of Application No. 23 of 2025 or the scope of section 41D(2)(c), and it recorded that it was inclined to grant substantive reliefs in terms of the first two prayers without the reference to clause (2)(c).
• The order is dated 24 September 2026, and the copy retained for this note was uploaded on 5 October 2026.